Arrow's impossibility theorem

Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result in social choice theory, proved by American economist Kenneth Arrow. It shows that no procedure for group decision-making under ordinal utilities can satisfy the requirements of rational choice theory. Specifically, no such rule can satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the principle that a choice between two alternatives A and B should not depend on the quality of some third, unrelated option, C.

Arrow's impossibility theorem - Wikipedia Jump to content From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers A joint Politics and Economics series Social choice and electoral systems Social choice Mechanism design Comparative politics Comparison List   ( By country ) Single-winner methods Single vote – plurality methods First preference plurality (FPP) Two-round ( US : Jungle primary ) Partisan primary Instant-runoff UK : Alternative vote (AV) US : Ranked-choice (RCV) Party block voting Plurality block voting Condorcet methods Condorcet-IRV Round-robin votin

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