Condorcet paradox

In social choice theory, Condorcet's voting paradox (also called Condorcet's paradox or the Condorcet paradox) is a fundamental discovery by the Marquis de Condorcet that majority rule is inherently self-contradictory. The result implies that it is logically impossible for any voting system to guarantee that a winner will have support from a majority of voters; for example, there can be rock-paper-scissors scenarios where a majority of voters will prefer A to B, B to C, and also C to A, even if every voter's individual preferences are rational and avoid self-contradiction. Examples of Condorcet's paradox are called Condorcet cycles or cyclic ties.

Condorcet paradox - Wikipedia Jump to content From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia This article is about results that can arise in a collective choice among three or more alternatives. For the contention that an individual's vote will probably not affect the outcome, see Paradox of voting . Self-contradiction of majority rule A joint Politics and Economics series Social choice and electoral systems Social choice Mechanism design Comparative politics Comparison List   ( By country ) Single-winner methods Single vote – plurality methods First preference plurality (FPP) Two-round ( US : Jun

saved by

• Anson Yu
• Aaron Pham
• Sidney Nimako

related reading

• Arrow's impossibility theorem - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Condorcet winner - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Berkson's paradox - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Abilene paradox - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Social Choice Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)plato.stanford.edu
• Borda count - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Paradox of voting - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Maximal lotteries - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Arrow’s Theorem (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)plato.stanford.edu
• Spoiler effect - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Single transferable vote - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Instant-runoff voting - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org