Breaking the Metric Voting Distortion Barrier
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Breaking the Metric Voting Distortion Barrier † † footnotetext: Emails: moses@cs.stanford.edu , pras1712@stanford.edu , kn.w@rutgers.edu , wuhx@berkeley.edu . Breaking the Metric Voting Distortion Barrier Moses Charikar Stanford and Prasanna Ramakrishnan Stanford and Kangning Wang Rutgers and Hongxun Wu UC Berkeley Abstract We consider the following well-studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose we have an election with n 𝑛 n italic_n voters and m 𝑚 m italic_m candidates located in a shared metric space. We would like to design a voting rule that chooses a candidate whos
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