Metric Distortion Under Probabilistic Voting
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Metric Distortion Under Probabilistic Voting Metric Distortion Under Probabilistic Voting Mohak Goyal Stanford University mohakg@stanford.edu Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar Stanford University sahasras@stanford.edu Abstract Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter’s cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters submit rankings, and the rule aggregates these rankings to determine a winner. We extend this framework to incorporate probabilistic voting, re
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