Verification Without a Treaty → UNIDIR
In the established practice of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements, verification provisions are negotiated as part of a treaty to provide States with a mechanism to assess compliance and to deter violations of its terms. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate new legally binding agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral. In some areas,
In the established practice of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements, verification provisions are negotiated as part of a treaty to provide States with a mechanism to assess compliance and to deter violations of its terms. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate new legally binding agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral. In some areas, in the absence of a functioning treaty, States assume certain obligations that constrain their behaviour, such as moratoriums on fissile material production or explosive nuclear tests, or a commitment to constrain…
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