[2606.05433] Zero knowledge verification for frontier AI training is possible
Abstract:Frontier AI governance frameworks increasingly use cumulative training compute as the primary criterion for designating high-impact models, but enforcement rests on self-reporting because no technical verification primitive for training exists. Any future international agreement on frontier AI faces the same problem at higher stakes: coordinated regulation of technologies with significant externalities has historically rested on technical verification, without which agreements are declaratory. Recent governance analyses judge zero-knowledge proofs a promising candidate but currently impractical at frontier scale [26, 4]. We argue the impracticality is paradigm-bound rather than fundamental, and propose a verification architecture for frontier dense pre-training combining a pre-committed training specification, inter-node network observations, and on-the-fly Merkle commitments of intermediate computation, verified through a zero-knowledge Virtual Machine (zkVM) with native BF16/FP32 precompiles. The proof checks the actual floating-point computation the GPU performed rather than a fixed-point approximation, and preserves model-architecture confidentiality through a private training specification. The protocol produces three proof types: a genesis proof at initialisation, in-training step proofs across the run, and ex-ante attestations enforcing policy-relevant claims as running invariants, turning the training record into a governance-enforceable artefact. We estimate a deployable proof of concept within approximately 36 months at single-digit-percent training-side overhead, against a six-to-ten-year cycle for verification-grade custom silicon. Thirteen open research and engineering problems are catalogued as a research agenda for external contribution
Zero knowledge verification for frontier AI training is possible Pierre Peigné - Lefebvre Ky Nguyen General-Purpose AI Policy Lab Paris Sorbonne Université, CNRS, LIP6 ppeigne@gpaipolicylab.org F-75005 Paris, France…
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