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Deontological values and moral trade – The Universe from an Intentional Stance

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[For this post, I’ll assume some familiarity with the concept of moral trade and the distinction between consequentialist and deontological values.] In earlier work, I claimed that (in the specific context of ECL) if you are trying to benefit someone’s moral view as part of some cooperative arrangement, only the consequentialist aspects of their moral values are relevant to you. That is, if you want to act cooperatively toward Alice’s moral values, then you need to consider only the consequentialist components of Alice’s value system. For instance, you need to ask yourself: Would Alice wish for there to be fewer lies? You don’t need to ask yourself whether Alice considers it a moral imperative not to lie herself (except insofar as it relates to the former question). While I still believe that there’s some truth to this claim, I now believe that the claim is straightforwardly incorrect. In short, it seems plausible that, for example, Alice’s moral imperative not to lie extends to action

[For this post, I’ll assume some familiarity with the concept of moral trade and the distinction between consequentialist and deontological values .] In earlier work, I claimed that (in the specific context of ECL ) if you are trying to benefit someone’s moral view as part of some cooperative arrangement, only the consequentialist aspects of their moral values are relevant to you. That is, if you want to act cooperatively toward Alice’s moral values, then you need to consider only the consequentialist components of Alice’s value system. For instance, you need to ask yourself: Would Alice wish

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