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Normativity in Metaethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu · 26,929 words · saved by 1 readers

You think to yourself, “I shouldn’t drink another Dr. Pepper. I’ve had two already”. But the claim that you shouldn’t drink another seems like a very different kind of claim than the claim that you’ve had two Dr. Peppers already. Broadly (and vaguely) speaking, the first claim tells us something action-guiding, whereas the second does not. The first tells us something about your reasons for acting or thinking a certain way; the second, by itself, does not. In sum, the first is a normative claim, whereas the second is not. Action-guiding claims include claims about what someone ought to do, or should do, or is obligated to do, or has reason to do. Some philosophers take it that all normative claims are action-guiding in this way. We will take a broader view, however, and include evaluative claims among those that we classify as “normative”. Examples are claims about what it would be good to do, or what would be praiseworthy or virtuous, or about beauty. Our reason for taking this broade

--> Normativity in Metaethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Menu Browse Table of Contents What's New Random Entry Chronological Archives About Editorial Information About the SEP Editorial Board How to Cite the SEP Special Characters Advanced Tools Contact Support SEP Support the SEP PDFs for SEP Friends Make a Donation SEPIA for Libraries Entry Navigation Entry Contents Bibliography Academic Tools Friends PDF Preview Author and Citation Info Back to Top Normativity in Metaethics First published Tue Jul 12, 2022 You think to yourself, "I shouldn't dr

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