Why it can be OK to predictably lose - Joe Carlsmith
This is the second essay in a four-part series on expected utility maximization (EUM). This part focuses on why it can make sense, in cases like “save one life for certain, or 1000 with 1% chance,” to choose the risky option, and hence to “predictably lose.” The answer is unsurprising: sometimes the upside is worth it. I offer three arguments to clarify this with respect to life-saving in particular. Ultimately, though, while EUM imposes consistency constraints on our choices, it does not provide guidance about what's "worth it" or not -- and in some cases, the world doesn't either. Ultimately, you have to decide.
Why it can be OK to predictably lose - Joe Carlsmith On expected utility / Part 2 Why it can be OK to predictably lose Contents hide I. Sometimes it’s worth it II. Small probabilities are just bigger conditional probabilities in disguise III. Nothing special about getting saved on heads vs. tails IV. What would everyone prefer? V. Taking responsibility Last updated: 03.23.2022 Published: 03.18.2022 Series On expected utility / Part 2 Why it can be OK to predictably lose Previously in sequence: Skyscrapers and madmen . PDF of the full series here . This is the second essay in a four-part series
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