Skyscrapers and madmen - Joe Carlsmith
This is the first essay in a four part series on expected utility maximization (EUM). It presents a way of visualizing EUM that I call the “skyscraper model.” It also discusses (1) the failure of the “quick argument,” (2) reasons not to let your epistemic relationship to EUM stop at “apparently the math says blah,” and (3) whether being “representable” as an EUM-er is trivial (in the relevant sense, I don’t think so).
Skyscrapers and madmen - Joe Carlsmith On expected utility / Part 1 Skyscrapers and madmen Contents hide Summary I. Maximal skyscraper II. Only one shot III. Against “apparently the scary math says so?” IV. Is being an EUM-er trivial? Last updated: 03.21.2022 Published: 03.16.2022 Series On expected utility / Part 1 Skyscrapers and madmen This is the first essay in a four part series on expected utility maximization. PDF of entire series here . Summary Suppose that you’re trying to do something. Maybe: get a job, or pick a restaurant, or raise money to pay medical bills. Some people think that
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