Mai Chi Dang

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on the atlas — 34

highlights — 319

, Marine Le Pen changed the party’s policy on a number of issues that affect women: it abandoned its condemnation of abortion (defining it now as a “sad necessity”), and started to defend the free allocation of parental leave to both parents and the possibility of them sharing it, signalling a significant rupture with her father’s leadership
The ‘gender turn’ of the populist radical right | openDemocracy
Furthermore, in asking this second question, we underscore the feminist understanding of women as thinking beings. Women may often have minimal power, but they still think.If any woman finds the populist “they” and “our” narrative appealing, we need to know why. If any woman takes steps to challenge the populists’ agenda for her, we need to know how and why she takes that action.
Revisiting Feminist IR Theory: How Do the Dual Challenges of Populism and the Pandemic Affect Gender? A Conversation with Prof. Cynthia Enloe – Global Panorama
Hungarians had possibly never been so well off as they were in the spring of 2006. But by the time the Socialists recovered from the flush of victory, it became clear that the heritage of the Medgyessy government, one riddled with hurdles, could not be continued. The golden age, based on some illusions back to the regime change, had come to an end.
Hopes and Illusions: Idealism in Hungarian Politics | IWM WEBSITE
Fidesz’s flawed campaign also contributed to this success. Their slogan “We are worse off than we were four years ago” had been based on a misinterpretation of economic realities.
Hopes and Illusions: Idealism in Hungarian Politics | IWM WEBSITE
May 2004 accession the European Union, it seemed that the country had finally recovered from the economic crisis that began in the 1970s and spanned the transition period
Hopes and Illusions: Idealism in Hungarian Politics | IWM WEBSITE
People were patient enough in the first part of the 1990s to wait until the crisis of transformation ends because they strongly believed that democratisation and economic development were parallel processes. Moreover, they believed that democracy would inevitably bring welfare soon. This hope was characteristic in the transition period already when centre right forces tried to implement social market economy, following Konrad Adenauer’s idea. The liberals, on the other hand, who lost the elections of 1990, promoted economic ‘shock therapy’ measures,
Hopes and Illusions: Idealism in Hungarian Politics | IWM WEBSITE
. They fuel fear, resentment and powerful narratives that frame universities as threats
Leaders in India, Hungary and the US are using appeals to nostalgia and nationalism to attack higher education
For two decades after 1989, the political philosophy of postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe could be summarized in a single imperative: Imitate the West! The process was called by different names—democratization, liberalization, enlargement, convergence, integration, Europeanization—but the goal pursued by postcommunist reformers was simple. They wished their countries to become “normal,” which meant like the West
Explaining Eastern Europe: Imitation and Its Discontents | Journal of Democracy
Far from being naturally and inherently Eurosceptic, the study shows how the FN and MSI, in their earlier years, advocated further European integration, not least with a view that a united Europe would provide security against external threats, including communism (and the USSR), materialism (embodied by the USA), demographic decline and immigration.
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
Lorimer structures the book around four key concepts central to her cases’ narratives about Europe: identity, liberty, threat, and national interes
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
The multifaceted issue of European integration has given far-right parties an opportunity ‘to refashion their political message in a more acceptable form, while maintaining the allegiance of their existing supporters’ (Lorimer Citation2024: 2
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
he key argument of the book is that far-right parties have used ‘Europe’ as an ‘ideological resource’ to gain legitimacy as political actors
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
Marta Lorimer’s book similarly offers a nuanced perspective on how far-right political actors speak about, and position themselves on, the issue of European integration.
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
discursive analysis of two parties on the radical ends of the political spectrum: the radical left Podemos in Spain and the (increasingly) radical right Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) in Germany
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
. Yet there is still a tendency to treat the connection between radical populist politics and Euroscepticism as a give
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
Meloni enjoys seemingly cozy and constructive relationships with various European leaders, illustrating the continuing legitimisation and normalisation of the far right (Mudde Citation2019).
Full article: Populism, the far right and EU integration: beyond simple dichotomies
Mihkel Lees (2016) Estonian Education System 1990-2016: Reforms and their impact, Estonian Min- istry of Education and Research, http://4liberty.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Estonian-Educa- tion-System_1990-2016.pdf
doc_PuAbUeyh_TheEstonianExperiment.pdf
if private schools wished to issue an education certificate following a pupil’s completion of the general educational programme for minorities, they also had to comply with the legal regulation in force at the material time, including specifications as to how much the State language and minority languages should be used in teaching
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
the Constitutional Court noted that the present case was different, as it concerned private schools. That said, the Constitutional Court also concluded that pupils whose native language was not the State language of Latvia, but another language, were not in a comparable situation to those pupils whose native language was the State language.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
impugned provision governed the language of instruction in private schools offering general and vocational education at primary and secondary level.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
It examined the compatibility of the impugned provision with the first sentence of Article 112 of the Constitution (the right to education), in conjunction with Article 114 (the rights of minorities), the second sentence of Article 91 (the principle of non-discrimination) and Article 1 (the principle of legal certainty
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
). In those proceedings, the Constitutional Court was not called upon to address the compatibility of the impugned provision with Article 96 of the Constitution (the right to private life) or Article 8 of the Convention, as none of the parties had raised any complaints in that regard (see paragraphs 25 and 28 above)
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
initially refused to institute proceedings, because they had failed to provide legal reasoning
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
The Constitutional Court refused to institute proceedings, referring to section 20 of the Law on the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 57 below)
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
a private school, school N., where most of the subjects were taught in Russian; only a small proportion of subjects were taught in Latvian. According to the applicants, the son received an education in accordance with that school’s educational programme, without any specifications about how much Latvian should be used as the language of instruction.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
. Although most of the subjects were taught in Russian, the educational programme was similar to one of the programmes envisaged for public schools
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
education in accordance with the educational programme for minorities at primary level.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
According to the applicants, the second applicant attended school K. because school L. was not ready to provide a high-quality education in Latvian; it lacked study materials and qualified teachers to teach in Latvian. In the school years 2020-23 the second applicant was in classes seven, eight and nine at school K. He received an education in accordance with the international educational programme (British education system).
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
In the 2014/15 school year the second applicant was in class one at a private school, school E. One subject (Latvian) was taught in Latvian, and other subjects were taught in Russian. Subsequently, in school years 2015-19 he attended classes two, three, four, and five at another private school, school L. Although most of the subjects were taught in Russian,
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
“permanently resident non-citizen”
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
. The family identifies with Russian culture and the Russian language. Russian is the main language used within the family. The first, second and third applicants lodged a constitutional complaint concerning the language of instruction in private schools, but the proceedings were instituted only in respect of the second and third applicants (see paragraph 25 below
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
. They are all Latvian citizens; the first applicant acquired Latvian citizenship by naturalisation in 2001. The family is ethnically mixed – the first applicant identifies himself as being of Russian and Georgian origin; in the official records his ethnicity is recorded as Georgian. The second and third applicants identify themselves as ethnic Russians.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
In accordance with the 2018 amendments, over a transitional period from 1 September 2019 (the 2019/20 school year) to 1 September 2021 (the 2021/22 school year), the following changes relating to how much teaching was in the official language of the State were to be implemented (ibid., §§ 23, 26-27, 59): (i) no less than 50 % of the teaching should be in Latvian in classes one to six; (ii) no less than 80 % of the teaching should be in Latvian in classes seven to nine; (iii) 100 % of the teaching should be in Latvian in classes ten to twelve.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
not apply to educational institutions implementing educational programmes in accordance with bilateral or multilateral international agreements, educational institutions in which the subjects of general education programmes were completely or partly taught in a foreign language to ensure the learning of other official languages of the European Union (EU), and educational institutions specified in other laws, such as the International School Law (ibid., §§ 59 and 62).
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
The impugned 2018 amendments provided that all schools, including private schools, had to ensure instruction in the State language (see Valiullina and Others, cited above, §§ 21-27).
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
While they had some freedom in organising the provision of education, they did not have any choice as to the results to be achieved – their pupils had to learn the State language and take examinations completing their studies, which included the State language exam. The applicants referred to findings made by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (“the Venice Commission”) concluding that prior to the 2018 reform, education in the State language had been mandatory only in public schools (paragraph 43 of the opinion, quoted in Valiullina and Others, cited above, § 93).
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
According to the applicants, the education reform prior to the 2018 amendments did not establish any specific requirements in relation to the language of instruction in private schools. The relevant provision (section 9(2)(1) of the Education Law) clearly provided an exception from the general requirement to use the State language, stating “Education may be acquired in another language: ... in private schools”.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
The historical background of education, Russification policies and minority schools in Soviet times has been described in Valiullina and Others (cited above, §§ 11-12).
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
Savickis and Others v. Latvia
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
The applicants are parents and children who identify themselves as belonging to the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia (see, for more detail, paragraphs 15-17 below). They were represented by Ms I. Nikuļceva, a lawyer practising in Riga.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
concerns legislative amendments of 2018 (“the 2018 amendments” or “the 2018 reform”) whereby the proportion of subjects to be taught in the State language, that is, Latvian, was increased in private schools and the use of Russian as the language of instruction was consequently reduced. The applicants rely on Article 8 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.
DŽIBUTI AND OTHERS v. LATVIA
In Valiullina and others v. Latvia and Džibuti and others v. Latvia, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights unanimously approved of further restrictions on Russian-language education in Latvia, thereby depriving a huge proportion of the population of the Republic of Latvia of education in their mother tongue.
Hijacking Human Rights to Enable Punishment by Association: Valiullina, Džibuti and Outlawing Minority Schooling in Latvia - Strasbourg Observers
They complained to the ECtHR that their right to private and family life (Article 8) and education (Article 2, Protocol 1) had been violated and that they had been discriminated against based on their language and ethnicity (Article 14 + Article 2 Protocol 1) because of the 2018 reform.
Hijacking Human Rights to Enable Punishment by Association: Valiullina, Džibuti and Outlawing Minority Schooling in Latvia - Strasbourg Observers
The reasoning of the ECtHR in greenlighting the 2018 reform is thus of crucial importance to the future scrutiny of the outlawing of minority language education in Latvia, with direct implications for the education of a huge proportion of the children in the bilingual republic.
Hijacking Human Rights to Enable Punishment by Association: Valiullina, Džibuti and Outlawing Minority Schooling in Latvia - Strasbourg Observers
As a result, Latvian children belonging to minority groups can no longer obtain education where substantial parts of the curriculum are taught in their mother tongue. Far-reaching exceptions are granted for international schools. Education in English, French and German, among others, is fine. It is only the Russian language – one of the two main languages spoken in the Republic of Latvia despite not being recognised officially – which is presented as a problem.
Hijacking Human Rights to Enable Punishment by Association: Valiullina, Džibuti and Outlawing Minority Schooling in Latvia - Strasbourg Observers
https://rm.coe.int/16800c10cf
doc_PuAbUeyh_TheEstonianExperiment.pdf
FUEN described the situation as a gross violation of the rights of the Russian national minority, including their right to preserve their identity. The organization also criticized the use of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a pretext for a long-standing policy of discrimination and pressure on the Russian population.
The closure of Russian schools in Estonia: education, reform, or forced assimilation?
The Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), the largest umbrella organization for national minorities in Europe, condemned Estonia’s policy, stating that the government has accelerated the Estonianization of Russian kindergartens and schools.
The closure of Russian schools in Estonia: education, reform, or forced assimilation?
OSCE and the UN Human Rights Committee, have expressed concerns and urged Estonia to comply with its international obligations, particularly under legally binding documents such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, Art. 2(2), 13), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, Art. 26), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM, Art. 14), and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML, Art. 8).
The closure of Russian schools in Estonia: education, reform, or forced assimilation?
several cases have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), highlighting the demand for Russian-language education. Activists from the NGO “Russian School of Estonia” have filed lawsuits over two cases: the closure of Keila’s last Russian school and the refusal of Tallinn’s Haabersti Russian Gymnasium to offer Russian-language education.
The closure of Russian schools in Estonia: education, reform, or forced assimilation?