thesis_ch4.pdf
cs.cmu.edu · 4,114 words · saved by 1 readers
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Chapter 4 Mechanism Design Honesty is the best policy - when there is money in it. Mark Twain In order for a preference aggregator to choose a good outcome, she needs to be provided with the agents’ (relevant) preferences. Usually, the only way of learning these preferences is by having the agents report them. Unfortunately, in settings where the agents are self-interested, they will report these preferences truthfully if and only if it is in their best interest to do so. Thus, the preference…
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