20251202_haupt_hitzig_cp.pdf
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Contextually Private Mechanisms Andreas Haupt and Zoë Hitzig∗ December 2, 2025 Abstract We introduce a framework for comparing the privacy of different mechanisms. A mechanism designer employs a dynamic protocol to elicit agents’ private information. Protocols produce a set of contextual privacy violations—information learned about agents that may be superfluous given the context. A protocol is maximally contextually private if…
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