The Saturation View

Will MacAskill presents a new theory of population ethics: the Saturation View.

24th April 2026 [AI Narration] The Saturation View Playback speed Volume 0:00 of 1:31:29 0. Introduction In Reasons and Persons, Parfit presented the challenge of developing “Theory X”: a theory of beneficence that dissolves the Mere Addition Paradox, avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion without facing other unacceptable conclusions.1 This note describes a new view in population axiology2 — the Saturation View, or Saturationism. I think it’s a plausible candidate for Theory X. The idea came out of work I’m doing with Christian Tarsney, whom I have to thank heavily for extensive back and…

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• Ratan Kaliani
• Lydia Nottingham
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related reading

• The Lifespan Dilemma — LessWronglesswrong.com
• The Repugnant Conclusion (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)plato.stanford.edu
• Askell-PhD-Thesis.pdfaskell.io
• More People Means More Goodetiennefd.substack.com
• On infinite ethics - Joe Carlsmithjoecarlsmith.com
• Prolegomena to a Theory of Fun — LessWronglesswrong.com
• Introduction to suffering-focused ethics — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org
• Mere addition paradox - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org
• Point-by-point critique of Ord’s “Why I’m Not a Negative Utilitarian”centerforreducingsuffering.org
• Highlights From The Comments On The Repugnant Conclusion And WWOTFastralcodexten.substack.com
• Arguments for Utilitarianism | Utilitarianism.netutilitarianism.net
• No Easy Eutopia: Why Great Futures Are Hard to Achieveforethought.org