Towards a Formal Scientific Epistemology - by Richard Ngo
mindthefuture.info · 2,056 words · saved by 1 readers
Reevaluating Garrabrant induction
In my post “Why I’m not a Bayesian”, I argued that the Bayesian approach of assigning credences to propositions with binary truth values only works in simple and restricted domains. Instead, I claimed, a better approach to epistemology is to assign degrees of truth to models of the world. This approach is broadly inspired by science, which is the domain from which we have the most evidence about which epistemological practices allow us to solve very hard problems. We don’t currently have a complete theory of scientific epistemology, but we can identify some important differences between…
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