Phenomenal concept strategy - Wikipedia
The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is an approach within philosophy of mind to provide a physicalist response to anti-physicalist arguments like the explanatory gap and philosophical zombies. The name was coined by Daniel Stoljar.[1] As David Chalmers put it, PCS "locates the gap in the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, rather than in the relationship between physical processes and consciousness themselves."[2] The idea is that if we can explain why we think there is an explanatory gap, this will defuse the motivation to question physicalism.[2] PCS advocates typically subscribe to[2] what Chalmers has called "type-B materialism",[3] which holds that there is an epistemic but not ontological gap between physics and subjective experience. PCS maintains that our concepts are dualistic, but reality is monistic, in a similar way as "heat" and "molecular motion" are two different concepts that refer to the same property.[2] However
Phenomenal concept strategy - Wikipedia Jump to content From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Approach within philosophy of mind The phenomenal concept strategy ( PCS ) is an approach within philosophy of mind to provide a physicalist response to anti-physicalist arguments like the explanatory gap and philosophical zombies . The name was coined by Daniel Stoljar . [ 1 ] As David Chalmers put it, PCS "locates the gap in the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, rather than in the relationship between physical processes and consciousness thems
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