Non-materialist physicalism: an experimentally testable conjecture.
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Does consciousness disclose the intrinsic nature of the physical?
Non-materialist physicalism: an experimentally testable conjecture. NON-MATERIALIST PHYSICALISM An experimentally testable conjecture by David Pearce "You're nothing but a pack of neurons" (Francis Crick) ABSTRACT Mankind's most successful story of the world, natural science, leaves the existence of consciousness wholly unexplained. The phenomenal binding problem deepens the mystery. Neither classical nor quantum physics seem to allow the binding of distributively processed neuronal micro-experiences into unitary experiential objects apprehended by a unitary phenomenal self. This paper argues
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