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Why I Am Not a Type-F Monist

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This piece sketches my (perhaps inadequate) understanding of type-F monism in the philosophy of mind. I argue that the view is ultimately either a form of type-A physicalism or a form of property dualism (broadly construed). The reasons to reject property dualism also apply to property-dualist interpretations of type-F monism. In addition, type-F monism relies on categorical properties, whose existence I'm skeptical of. Note: This piece is a work in progress. I'm not an expert on type-F monism or the debate over dispositional monism. Note: This piece uses the terminology of Chalmers (2003). See that article for definitions of type-A through type-F views on consciousness. In my opinion, if you're not a type-A physicalist or an idealist regarding consciousness, then you're ultimately a property dualist, whether you admit it or not. I'll ignore idealism in this piece and focus on the contrast between type-A physicalism and property dualism. Type-A physicalists maintain that there is only

By Brian Tomasik First published: 21 Feb 2017. Last nontrivial update: 25 Mar 2018. Summary This piece sketches my (perhaps inadequate) understanding of type-F monism in the philosophy of mind. I argue that the view is ultimately either a form of type-A physicalism or a form of property dualism (broadly construed). The reasons to reject property dualism also apply to property-dualist interpretations of type-F monism. In addition, type-F monism relies on categorical properties, whose existence I'm skeptical of. Note : This piece is a work in progress. I'm not an expert on type-F monism or the d

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