Knowledge argument
In philosophy of mind, the knowledge argument (also known as Mary's Room, Mary the Colour Scientist, or Mary the super-scientist) is a thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson in his article "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982), and extended in "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986).
Did Mary learn something new? In philosophy of mind, the knowledge argument (also known as Mary's Room, Mary the Colour Scientist, or Mary the super-scientist) is a thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson in his article "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982),[1] and extended in "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986).[2][3] The thought experiment describes Mary, a scientist who exists in a black-and-white world where she has extensive access to physical descriptions of color, but no actual perceptual experience of color. Mary has learned everything there is to learn about color, but she has never…
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