An Objection to Chalmers's Fading Qualia Argument

[Note: This is a long and dense post.

An Objection to Chalmers's Fading Qualia Argument Eric Schwitzgebel Oct 22, 2024 8 6 1 Share [Note: This is a long and dense post. Buckle up. Or skip, if you’re not interested in technical philosophy of mind debates, three conversational moves in.] In one chapter of his influential 1996 book , David Chalmers defends the view that consciousness arises in virtue of the functional organization of the brain rather than in virtue of the brain's material substrate. That is, if there were entities that were functionally/organizationally identical to humans but made out of different stuff (e.g. silico

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