Moore's paradox
Moore's paradox concerns the apparent absurdity involved in asserting a first-person present-tense sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" or "It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining." The first author to note this apparent absurdity was George E. Moore. These 'Moorean' sentences, as they have become known, are paradoxical in that while they appear absurd, they nevertheless
Moore's paradox - Wikipedia Jump to content From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Philosophical paradox concerning seemingly-absurd assertions Not to be confused with Langford–Moore paradox or Moore's law . Moore's paradox concerns the apparent absurdity involved in asserting a first-person present-tense sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" or "It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining." The first author to note this apparent absurdity was G. E. Moore . [ 1 ] These "Moorean" sentences, as they have become known, are paradoxical in that while they
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