Probabilities, Prioritization, and Bayesian Mindset

The epistemology of EA, continued.

Hey, it’s been a while. In the coming months, I’ll have a few more posts about the practical epistemology of effective altruism. A bit more on what it is (prior post), its potential implications, and the degree to which it’s justified. This post (also on the EA Forum) touches on the justification question. The project matters to me. EA is weird. Not just socially weird, but intellectually weird. EAs (for better or worse) think differently, and I don’t think many people (including those enmeshed within EA) have a crisp idea of what makes them so unusual. My project, in part, is motivated by…

related reading

• Bayesian Mindsetcold-takes.com
• Probabilities Without Measurements | Vaden Masranivmasrani.github.io
• Effective Altruism's Implicit Epistemologyforum.effectivealtruism.org
• Doing EA Better — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org
• Why We Can't Take Expected Value Estimates Literally (Even When They're Unbiased) — LessWronglesswrong.com
• Effective Altruism's Implicit Epistemologytheviolethour.substack.com
• Notes on Effective Altruismmichaelnotebook.com
• Probabilities are not the right concept — LessWronglesswrong.com
• Knowing About Biases Can Hurt People — LessWronglesswrong.com
• Why we can't take expected value estimates literally (even when they're unbiased) - The GiveWell Blogblog.givewell.org
• Comments on “How To Think Real Good” | Meta-rationalitymetarationality.com
• The Value of Probabilistic Thinking: Spies, Crime, and Lightning Strikesfs.blog