Probabilities, Prioritization, and Bayesian Mindset

The epistemology of EA, continued.

Hey, it’s been a while. In the coming months, I’ll have a few more posts about the practical epistemology of effective altruism. A bit more on what it is (prior post), its potential implications, and the degree to which it’s justified. This post (also on the EA Forum) touches on the justification question. The project matters to me. EA is weird. Not just socially weird, but intellectually weird. EAs (for better or worse) think differently, and I don’t think many people (including those enmeshed within EA) have a crisp idea of what makes them so unusual. My project, in part, is motivated by…

related reading

• Bayesian Mindsetcold-takes.com
• Why I'm not a Bayesianmindthefuture.info
• Effective Altruism's Implicit Epistemologyforum.effectivealtruism.org
• Probabilities are not the right concept — LessWronglesswrong.com
• Probabilities Without Measurements | Vaden Masranivmasrani.github.io
• Effective Altruism's Implicit Epistemologytheviolethour.substack.com
• How To Think Real Good | Meta-rationalitymetarationality.com
• Doing EA Better — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org
• Knowing About Biases Can Hurt People — LessWronglesswrong.com
• Towards a scale-free theory of intelligent agencymindthefuture.info
• We should be more uncertain about cause prioritization based on philosophical arguments — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org
• In defence of epistemic modesty — EA Forumforum.effectivealtruism.org