flâneur

Contrite Strategies and the Need for Standards | Sarah Constantin

srconstantin.github.io · 1,127 words · saved by 2 readers

There’s a really interesting paper from 1996 called The Logic of Contrition, which I’ll summarize here. In it, the authors identify a strategy called “Contrite Tit For Tat”, which does better than either Pavlov or Generous Tit For Tat in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In Contrite Tit For Tat, the player doesn’t only look at what he and the other player played on the last term, but also another variable, the standing of the players, which can be good or bad. If Bob defected on Alice last round but Alice was in good standing, then Bob’s standing switches to bad, and Alice defects against Bob. If Bob defected on Alice last round but Alice was in _bad _standing, then Bob’s standing stays good, and Alice cooperates with Bob. If Bob cooperated with Alice last round, Bob keeps his good standing, and Alice cooperates. This allows two Contrite Tit For Tat players to recover quickly from accidental defections without defecting against each other forever; D/C -> C/D -> C/C But, unlike Pavlov, it co

Epistemic Status: Confident There’s a really interesting paper from 1996 called The Logic of Contrition , which I’ll summarize here. In it, the authors identify a strategy called “Contrite Tit For Tat”, which does better than either Pavlov or Generous Tit For Tat in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In Contrite Tit For Tat, the player doesn’t only look at what he and the other player played on the last term, but also another variable, the standing of the players, which can be good or bad. If Bob defected on Alice last round but Alice was in good standing, then Bob’s standing switches to bad, and Al

saved by

related reading