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The Splintered Mind: Neurons Aren't Special: A Copernican Argument

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In virtue of what do human beings have conscious experiences?  How is it that there's "something it's like" to be us, while there's (presumably) nothing it's like to be a rock or a virus?  Our brains must have something to do with it -- but why?  Is it because brains are complex information processors?  Or because brains guide the sophisticated behavior of bodies embedded in rich environments?  Or because neurons in particular have a special power to give rise to consciousness? Posted by Eric Schwitzgebel at 12:30 PM Labels: consciousness, cosmology upon reading the opening to this piece, the word imagination popped. as I read further, commentary from Block included reference to the word and notion. we imagine all sorts of things---some imaginings are *vain* or, in vain; others are quite real and within the realm of possibility. we mostly do not think about what it "is like" to be things like rocks or viruses because those are mindless entities, in our best assessment. imagination, in

The Splintered Mind: Neurons Aren't Special: A Copernican Argument skip to main | skip to sidebar The Splintered Mind reflections in philosophy of psychology, broadly construed Friday, April 26, 2024 Neurons Aren't Special: A Copernican Argument In virtue of what do human beings have conscious experiences? How is it that there's " something it's like " to be us, while there's (presumably) nothing it's like to be a rock or a virus? Our brains must have something to do with it -- but why? Is it because brains are complex information processors? Or because brains guide the sophisticated behavior

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