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The Splintered Mind: An Objection to Chalmers's Fading Qualia Argument

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Would a neuron-for-neuron silicon isomorph of you have conscious experiences? Or is there something special about the biology of neurons, so that no brain made of silicon, no matter how sophisticated and similar to yours, could actually have conscious experiences? In his 1996 book and a related 1995 article, David Chalmers offers what he calls the "fading qualia" argument that there's nothing in principle special about neurons (see also Cuda 1985). The basic idea is that, in principle, scientists could swap your neurons out one by one, and you'd never notice the difference. But if your consciousness were to disappear during this process, you would notice the difference. Therefore, your consciousness would not disappear. A similar idea underlies Susan Schneider's "Chip Test" for silicon consciousness: To check whether some proposed cognitive substrate really supports consciousness, slowly swap out your neurons for that substrate, a piece at a time, checking for losses of consciousness a

The Splintered Mind: An Objection to Chalmers's Fading Qualia Argument skip to main | skip to sidebar The Splintered Mind reflections in philosophy of psychology, broadly construed Tuesday, December 13, 2022 An Objection to Chalmers's Fading Qualia Argument Would a neuron-for-neuron silicon isomorph of you have conscious experiences? Or is there something special about the biology of neurons, so that no brain made of silicon, no matter how sophisticated and similar to yours, could actually have conscious experiences? In his 1996 book and a related 1995 article , David Chalmers offers what he c

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