flâneur — a map of the web's best reading

What is causality to an evidential decision theorist? – The sideways view

sideways-view.com · 1,569 words · saved by 1 readers

People sometimes object to evidential decision theory by saying: “It seems like the distinction between correlation and causation is really important to making good decisions in practice. So how can a theory like EDT, with no role for causality, possibly be right?” Long-time readers probably know my answer, but I want to articulate it in a little bit more detail. This is essentially identical to the treatment of causality in Eliezer Yudkowsky’s manuscript Timeless Decision Theory, but much shorter and probably less clear. If a system is well-described by a causal diagram, then it satisfies a complex set of statistical relationships. For example: To an evidential decision theorist, these kinds of statistical relationships are the whole story about causality, or at least about its relevance to decisions. We could still ask why such relationships exist, but the answer wouldn’t matter to what we should do. Now suppose that I’m making a decision X, trying to optimize Y. And suppose further

( Subsumed by: Timeless Decision Theory , EDT=CDT ) People sometimes object to evidential decision theory by saying: “It seems like the distinction between correlation and causation is really important to making good decisions in practice. So how can a theory like EDT, with no role for causality, possibly be right?” Long-time readers probably know my answer, but I want to articulate it in a little bit more detail. This is essentially identical to the treatment of causality in Eliezer Yudkowsky’s manuscript Timeless Decision Theory , but much shorter and probably less clear. C

Explore this link on the map →

related reading