In defence of epistemic modesty
This piece defends a strong form of epistemic modesty: that, in most cases, one should pay scarcely any attention to what you find the most persuasive view on an issue, hewing instead to an idealized…
In defence of epistemic modesty — EA Forum Hide table of contents In defence of epistemic modesty by Gregory Lewis🔸 Oct 29 2017 44 min read 52 162 Building effective altruism Philosophy Epistemic deference Rationality Cluelessness Criticism of effective altruism Independent impression Philosophy of effective altruism Frontpage In defence of epistemic modesty Provocation Introductions and clarifications A favourable motivating case Weaker and stronger forms of modesty Motivations for more modesty The symmetry case Compressed sensing of (and not double-counting) the object level Repeated measur
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