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Can We Naturalize Moral Epistemology? — LessWrong

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Another question to ask, even assuming faultless convergence, related to uniqueness, is whether the process of updates has a endpoint at all. That is, I could imagine that there exists series of arguments that would convince someone who believes X to believe Y, and a set that would convince someone who believes Y to believe X. If both of these sets of arguments are persuasive even after someone has changed their mind before, we have a cycle which is compatible with faultless convergence, but has no endpoint. I'd rather your "that is" were a "for example". This is because: Epistemic status: shower thought quickly sketched, but I do have a PhD in this. As we approach AGI and need to figure out what goals to give it we will need to find tractable ways to resolve moral disagreement. One of the most intractable moral disagreements is between the moral realists and the moral antirealists. There's an oversimplified view of this disagreement that goes: This oversimplified picture gets a lot o

x Can We Naturalize Moral Epistemology? — LessWrong Ethics & Morality AI Frontpage 52 Can We Naturalize Moral Epistemology? by tylermjohn 21st May 2025 7 min read 22 52 Epistemic status: shower thought quickly sketched, but I do have a PhD in this. As we approach AGI and need to figure out what goals to give it we will need to find tractable ways to resolve moral disagreement. One of the most intractable moral disagreements is between the moral realists and the moral antirealists. There's an oversimplified view of this disagreement that goes: If you're a moral realist, you want to align AGI to

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