On Collusion
Over the last few years there has been an increasing interest in using deliberately engineered economic incentives and mechanism design to align behavior of participants in various contexts. In the blockchain space, mechanism design first and foremost provides the security for the blockchain itself, encouraging miners or proof of stake validators to participate honestly, but more recently it is being applied in prediction markets, "token curated registries" and many other contexts. The nascent RadicalXChange movement has meanwhile spawned experimentation with Harberger taxes, quadratic voting, quadratic financing and more. More recently, there has also been growing interest in using token-based incentives to try to encourage quality posts in social media. However, as development of these systems moves closer from theory to practice, there are a number of challenges that need to be addressed, challenges that I would argue have not yet been adequately confronted. As a recent example of t
Dark Mode Toggle On Collusion 2019 Apr 03 See all posts On Collusion Special thanks to Glen Weyl, Phil Daian and Jinglan Wang for review Over the last few years there has been an increasing interest in using deliberately engineered economic incentives and mechanism design to align behavior of participants in various contexts. In the blockchain space, mechanism design first and foremost provides the security for the blockchain itself, encouraging miners or proof of stake validators to participate honestly, but more recently it is being applied in prediction markets , " token curated registries
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