flâneur

Bel Chen

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on the atlas — 18

highlights — 5

  • This abilitycould be seen as one of the primary functions of consciousness – the ability tointeract with the same world and situation in multiple ways via the plethora ofperceptual and action programs afforded by the flexibility of attention
    (PDF) Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's veto and a close-enough theory of free will
  • Though affordances are a useful way of thinking about the action cues of-fered by objects, Gibson’s definition appears too limited – particularly withregards to his final two points. In keeping with his over-arching theory ofthe directness of visual perception, he maintains that affordances are invari-ant properties of an “object.” However, the direct perception hypothesis, whichcentred around an absence of any perceptual processing, has never gatheredmainstream support (see Fodor, & Pylyshyn 1981 for an early criticism). Bylooking at affordances as a property of the shared interaction between s…
    (PDF) Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's veto and a close-enough theory of free will
  • The program must therefore be brought into attention and unpackedinto its constituent parts for it to be repaired. The processes underlying playinga musical instrument, such as a guitar, provide a relevant example. Individualmuscle movements are chunked into the fingering and plucking or strummingof strings. These notes and chords are themselves chunked into progressions.The underlying motor “macros” operate ballistically, increasingly, as expertisewith the musical piece is developed. Once a bad habit is established, the attemptto modify it requires the unpacking, or unchunking, of that part of…
    (PDF) Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's veto and a close-enough theory of free will
  • Recently, Ann Graybiel (1998) has suggested that many motor actions may begrouped – or chunked – together to form structures similar to the Miller’s(1957) compression of discrete bits of information in memory) recodes men-tal representations of action sequences by reducing the number of distinctivelyrepresented units – essentially collapsing several motor programs into one.Thus, these action repertoires, once elicited, run both automatically and bal-listically. In Shallice’s contention scheduling, an action schema competes withothers and, when exceeding a threshold, is activated. To avoid confl…
    (PDF) Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's veto and a close-enough theory of free will
  • This veto argument, although influential, is not without its problems. Pri-marily: shouldn’t this conscious choice, concerning veto, be unconsciouslyinitiated as well? Libet (1999) tries valiantly to indicate that this is not neces-sary. However, he runs into the following problem: the veto choice is consciousand immediate, and must therefore occur in a window of 100 msec. Otherdecisions, as described previously, cannot be conscious because 300 msec arerequired for awareness of choice. In order to reconcile these seemingly incom-patible ideas, he therefore constructs a complex logical case, des…
    (PDF) Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's veto and a close-enough theory of free will