Jules Qian
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on the atlas · 69
- AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities - LessWrong17 savers
- How To Be Good | The New Yorker4 savers
- The Problems of Philosophy, by Bertrand Russell4 savers
- Tower BFT: Solana’s High Performance Implementation of PBFT | by Anatoly Yakovenko | Solana | Medium2 savers
- Excited altruism - The GiveWell Blog4 savers
- What makes for a dream job? Here's what the evidence says.9 savers
- Eight Short Studies On Excuses - LessWrong2 savers
- Saving the Liberal Arts - David Perell2 savers
- Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)2 savers
- The Church-Turing Thesis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)2 savers
- Blockheads Essays on Ned Blocks Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness by Adam Pautz, Daniel Stoljar (z-lib.org)1 savers
- Make Something Wonderful | Steve Jobs39 savers
- Mosaic LLMs (Part 2): GPT-3 quality for <$500k4 savers
- The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)2 savers
- Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik Hoel1 savers
- Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)4 savers
- Derek Parfit3 savers
- How An Algorithm Feels From Inside - LessWrong5 savers
- https://www.deeplearningbook.org/contents/linear_algebra.html4 savers
- Discovery fiction3 savers
- The Egg8 savers
- The founder of Teenage Engineering opens up to his creative space7 savers
- Quit Your Job59 savers
- i wish we’d grown up on the same advice - by vincent huang61 savers
- Minds, brains, programs. Searle, John. R.1 savers
- What Can We Learn from Barnes & Noble's Surprising Turnaround?6 savers
- finding the right people - by Nicole - startingfromnix49 savers
- Kernel | Trees Won’t Save Us11 savers
- Book 3 | Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 | Chicago Scholarship Online | Oxford Academic1 savers
- Don’t Surround Yourself With Smarter People54 savers
- Book 3 | Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 | Chicago Scholarship Online | Oxford Academic1 savers
- The Paradox Of Socially Responsible Computing2 savers
- Power Imbalances and Sex – Knowingless1 savers
- You Will Forget, You Have Forgotten - by Aella4 savers
- How I Lost My Faith – Knowingless4 savers
- Six Takeaways from Experts on AI Impact Assessments | Bipartisan Policy Center1 savers
- Do Nothing With Your Life - Blood Orange Review2 savers
- A Cosmos Thesis | Paradigm Research3 savers
- Søren Kierkegaard (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)2 savers
- Learning By Writing43 savers
- advice - nabeelqu43 savers
- crushes are often just misplaced ambition - by Isabel42 savers
- Why I’m Leaving Tech to Pursue Art35 savers
- The Strength of Being Misunderstood - Sam Altman32 savers
- the agony of eros: dating - by Ava - bookbear express28 savers
- Love is not a math problem - by Gonzalo Nuñez21 savers
- ⚡️ Towards Ineffective Altruism18 savers
- hard things15 savers
- Lights and Shadows – Bartosz Ciechanowski15 savers
- What I'm frustrated by in crypto13 savers
- Moravec's paradox13 savers
- Why I am not a longtermist – Windows On Theory13 savers
- What it’s like to be 28 -12 savers
- The world is awful. The world is much better. The world can be much better. - Our World in Data11 savers
- [1706.03762] Attention Is All You Need11 savers
- People Spend Too Much Time On Decisions with Equally Satisfying Outcomes11 savers
- stamina - by Ava - bookbear express11 savers
- What I Worked On10 savers
- Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights - The White House10 savers
- Introduction to Effective Altruism8 savers
- Intelligence killed genius - Alexey Guzey7 savers
- MEV and Me | Paradigm Research6 savers
- College students: it’s time to bet on yourselves.6 savers
- Grad school is worse for public health than STDs | benkuhn.net6 savers
- mind.pdf5 savers
- Fermi Estimates - LessWrong5 savers
- Simone de Beauvoir (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)4 savers
- Michel Foucault (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)3 savers
- In defence of epistemic modesty2 savers
highlights · 502
traditional problem called ‘quantification into intensional contexts’
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)syntactically alike (subject-verb-object), but are semantically very different
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)Thus, the meaning of an expression is determined by the way in which the expression is formed, and as such the derivational history plays a role in determining the meaning.
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)semantical properties of language
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)model theoretic semantics
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)failed to provide any serious analysis of linguistic meaning
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)for instance that natural languages develop without an a priori set of rules whereas artificial languages have an explicit syntax and are designed for a special purpose
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)for instance that natural languages develop without an a priori set of rules whereas artificial languages have an explicit syntax and are designed for a special purpose
Montague Semantics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)Turing is saying that the operations of a Turing machine include all those that a human mathematician needs to use when calculating a number by means of an effective method.
The Church-Turing Thesis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)but it is easy to see in a general way that there must be real numbers that cannot be computed by any Turing machine, since there are more real numbers than there are Turing-machine programs
The Church-Turing Thesis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)Without exercising any insight, intuition, or ingenuity, a human being can work through the instructions in the program and carry out the required operations.
The Church-Turing Thesis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)Turing’s thesis—that whenever there is an effective method for obtaining the values of a mathematical function, the function can be computed by a Turing machine.
The Church-Turing Thesis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)Ned Block’s “Blockhead” thought experiment
The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)logically possible for an entity to pass the kinds of tests that Descartes and (at least allegedly) Turing have in mind—to use words (and, perhaps, to act) in just the kind of way that human beings do—and yet to be entirely lacking in intelligence, not possessed of a mind, etc
The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)Cartesian de Cordemoy
The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)behavioural tests for the presence of mind, or thought, or intelligence in putatively minded entities
The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)question whether a digital computer can do well in a certain kind of game that Turing describes (“The Imitation Game”)
The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)hether machines can think is itself “too meaningless” to deserve discussion
The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)way of dealing with the question whether machines can think
The Turing Test (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)What the utilitarian doesn’t understand is that people’s feelings are not just random feelings
Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik HoelEvils and goods are not what is called “well-ordered.” Mathematically, this means that they cannot all be ranked in a gigantic set, from greatest to least, objectively, and so be added and subtracted against each other.
Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik HoelEliezer Yudkowsky, who writes in his Sequences
Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik Hoel“shut up and multiply”
Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik Hoelidea of “utility monsters” (originally introduced by Robert Nozick) is so devastating for utilitarianism—they take us from our local circumstances to a very different world in which monsters derive more pleasure and joy from eating humans than humans suffer from being eaten, and most people would find the pro-monsters-eating-humans position repugnant.
Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik HoelThis is because utilitarian logic is locally correct, in some instances, particularly in low-complexity ceteris paribus set-ups,
Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik Hoel“repugnant conclusion” was originally coined by Derek Parfit in his book Reasons and Persons, discussing how the end state of this sort of utilitarian reasoning is to prefer worlds where all available land is turned into places worse than the worst slums of Bangladesh, making life bad to the degree that it’s only barely worth living, but there are just so many people that when you plug it into the algorithm this repugnant scenario comes out as preferable.
Why I am not an effective altruist - by Erik HoelIt is an activity of clarification (of thoughts), and more so, of critique (of language)
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)philosophy is not a theory, or a doctrine, but rather an activity
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)This is not a happenstance thought; it is fundamental precisely because the limits of sense rest on logic. Tautologies and contradictions, the propositions of logic, are the limits of language and thought, and thereby the limits of the world.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)similarity to Hegel is that there is a “dialectical” character to the human self understood as spirit
Søren Kierkegaard (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)as self-conscious beings, humans still contain possibilities to be actualized
Søren Kierkegaard (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)one important difference from Sartre is that for Kierkegaard the idea of existentialist “self-creation” (or, perhaps better, “self-shaping”) needs to be synthesized with “self-acceptance:”
Søren Kierkegaard (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)self must become what it is to become, human selves playing an active role in the process by which they come to define themselves
Søren Kierkegaard (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)later Japanese thinkers such as Kitaro Nishida’s attempt to create a synthesis between eastern Buddhist thought and European philosophy
Søren Kierkegaard (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness... When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others.
Derek Parfitgiven the choice between surviving without psychological continuity and connectedness (Relation R) and dying but preserving R through someone else's future existence, which would you choose? Parfit argues the latter is preferable.
Derek ParfitIdentity is not as determinate as we often suppose it is, but instead such determinacy arises mainly from the way we talk. People exist in the same way that nations or clubs exist.
Derek Parfitindividuals are nothing more than brains and bodies, but identity cannot be reduced to either
Derek Parfitwe are mistaken in assuming that personal identity is what matters in survival; what matters is rather Relation R: psychological connectedness (namely, of memory and character) and continuity (overlapping chains of strong connectedness
Derek ParfitFor morality to matter, there had to be real reasons to care about it—objective facts about what was good and worth achieving. But if, like Williams, you believed that our only reasons for acting were our desires, then if a person desired bad or crazy things—to cause someone great pain; to cause himself great pain—there could be no decisive argument against pursuing them.
How To Be Good | The New YorkerTo him, morality was a human system that arose from human wants and remained dependent on them
How To Be Good | The New Yorkermeta-ethics—questions about the existence and nature of moral truths—was especially pointless
How To Be Good | The New YorkerNick Bostrom said that it’s no good having moral intelligent robots if they’re not conscious, so he is aware that you have to make sure they’re conscious.
How To Be Good | The New YorkerThis is not surprising: it's typically much easier to verify the solution to a problem than it is to find the solution
Discovery fiction“So the whole universe,” you said, “it’s just…” “An egg.”
The EggEvery time you victimized someone,” I said, “you were victimizing yourself. Every act of kindness you’ve done, you’ve done to yourself. Every happy and sad moment ever experienced by any human was, or will be, experienced by you.
The EggYour soul is more magnificent, beautiful, and gigantic than you can possibly imagine. A human mind can only contain a tiny fraction of what you are.
The EggYou have within you all the knowledge and experiences of all your past lives. You just don’t remember them right now.
The EggAll religions are right in their own way
The Egg