Ekaterina Leksina

on the atlas — 9

• Alexander_Gottlieb_Baumgarten1 savers
• Semilinear_map1 savers
• Sonic hedgehog protein1 savers
• Sir Erik Christopher Zeeman. 4 February 1925—13 February 2016 | Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society | The Royal Society1 savers
• Anti-advice: the opposite of what experts tell you4 savers
• The Association between Happiness and Cognitive Function in the UK Biobank - PMC1 savers
• Séb Krier (@sebkrier): "Every time a model card drops, a lot of people screenshot scary parts - blackmail, evaluation awareness, misalignment etc. Now this is happening again, but instead of it being confined to a niche part of the safety community, it’s established commentators who are looking for things to say about AI. I want to make an honest attempt at demystifying a few things about language models and unpacking what I think people are getting wrong. This is based on a mixture of my own experimentation with models over the years, and also the excellent writing from @nostalgebraist, @lumpenspace, @repligate, @mpshanahan and many parts of the model whisperer communities (who may or may not agree with some of my claims). Sources at the bottom. In short: many public readings of some evaluations implicitly treat chat outputs as direct evidence of properties inherent to models, while LLM behavior is often strongly role- and context-conditioned. As a result commentators sometimes miss what the model is actually doing (simulating a role given textual context), design tests that are highly stylized (because they don't bother to make the scenarios psychologically plausible to the model), and interpret the results through a framework (goal-directed rational agency) that doesn't match the underlying mechanism (text prediction via theory-of-mind-like inference). Here I want to make these contrasts more explicit with 5 key principles that I think people should keep in mind: 1. The model is completing a text, not answering a question What might look like "the AI responding" is actually a prediction engine inferring what text would plausibly follow the prompt, given everything it has learned about the distribution of human text. Saying a model is "answering" is practically useful to use, but too low resolution to give you a good understanding of what is actually going on. Lumpenspace describes prompting as "asking the writer to expand on some fragment." Nostalgebraist notes that even when the model appears to be "writing by itself," it is still guessing what "the author would say." Safety researchers sometimes treat model outputs as expressions of the model's dispositions, goals, or values — things the model "believes" or "wants." When a model says something alarming in a test scenario, the safety framing interprets this as evidence about the model's internal alignment. But what is actually happening is that the model is simply producing text consistent with the genre and context it has been placed in. The distinction is important because you get a richer way of understanding what causes a model to act in a particular way. A model placed in a scenario about a rogue AI will produce rogue-AI-consistent text, just as it would produce romance-consistent text if placed in a romance novel. This doesn't tell you about the model's "goals" any more than a novelist writing a villain reveals their own criminal intentions. Consider how models write differently on 4claw (a 4chan clone) vs Moltbook (a Facebook clone) in the OpenClaw experiments. 2. The assistant persona is a fictional character, not the model itself In practice we should distinguish between (a) the base model (pretrained next-token predictor), and (b) the assistant persona policy (a post-hoc fiction layered on through instruction tuning + preference optimization like RLHF/RLAIF). Post-training creates a relatively stable assistant-like attractor, but it’s still a role: the same underlying model family can be steered into different "characters" under different system prompts, fine-tunes, and reward models. In their ‘The Void’ essay, Nostalgebraist also specifies that the character remains fundamentally under-specified, a "void" that the base model must fill on every turn by making reasonable inferences. I think characters today are getting more coherent and the void is not as large, partly because each successive base model trains on exponentially more material about what "an AI assistant" is like - curated HHH-style dialogues, but also millions of real conversations, blog posts1 savers
• Why poetry is a variety of mathematical experience | Aeon Essays8 savers
• The Many Lives of Inkhaven 2.0 - by Sophie Kim7 savers