Governance mixing auctions and futarchy - Economics - Ethereum Research

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I’ll recall the strengths and weaknesses of 3 different group decisionmaking protocols: voting, auctions, and futarchy. I’ll describe a hybrid auction-prediction mechanism and call for more ideas! Governance decisions require aggregating two kinds of objects: These are orthogonal. I might personally prefer that my town builds a library instead of a park. But I might predict better outcomes for my town as a whole in the case of the park. Traditional voting schemes are designed to aggregate preferences, not information. (I’d presumably vote for the library). But even for pure preference aggregation, auctions can sometimes be better than voting. Voting is not incentive compatible, can be manipulated, doesn’t reflect strength of preference, etc. Instead, we could for instance auction off lottery tickets for the right to decide between a library and a park. People can express the strength of their preference by buying more tickets. (The revenue can be redistributed equally.) But neither auc

Governance mixing auctions and futarchy - Economics - Ethereum Research Governance mixing auctions and futarchy Economics governance bowaggoner September 17, 2021, 4:12am 1 Abstract I’ll recall the strengths and weaknesses of 3 different group decisionmaking protocols: voting, auctions, and futarchy. I’ll describe a hybrid auction-prediction mechanism and call for more ideas! Background Governance decisions require aggregating two kinds of objects: preferences information These are orthogonal. I might personally prefer that my town builds a library instead of a park. But I might predict better

Governance mixing auctions and futarchy - Economics - Ethereum Research

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