[2602.12316] GT-HarmBench: Benchmarking AI Safety Risks Through the Lens of Game Theory
Abstract:Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable and deployed in high-stakes multi-agent environments. However, existing AI safety benchmarks largely evaluate single agents, leaving multi-agent risks such as coordination failure and conflict poorly understood. We introduce GT-HarmBench, a benchmark of 2,009 high-stakes scenarios spanning game-theoretic structures such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Scenarios are drawn from realistic AI risk contexts in the MIT AI Risk Repository. Across 15 frontier models, agents choose socially beneficial actions in only 62% of cases, frequently leading to harmful outcomes. We measure sensitivity to game-theoretic prompt framing and ordering, and analyze reasoning patterns driving failures. We further show that game-theoretic interventions improve socially beneficial outcomes by up to 18%. Our results highlight substantial reliability gaps and provide a broad standardized testbed for studying alignment in multi-agent environments. The benchmark and code are available at this https URL.
# link_xih44c4dnh.pdf ## Metadata - PDFFormatVersion=1.7 - IsLinearized=false - IsAcroFormPresent=false - IsXFAPresent=false - IsCollectionPresent=false - IsSignaturesPresent=false - Author=Pepijn Cobben; Xuanqiang Angelo Huang; Thao Amelia Pham; Isabel Dahlgren; Terry Jingchen Zhang; Zhijing Jin - Creator=arXiv GenPDF (tex2pdf:a6404ea) - Custom.DOI=https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2602.12316 - Custom.License=http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ - Custom.PTEX.Fullbanner=This is pdfTeX, Version 3.141592653-2.6-1.40.28 (TeX Live 2025) kpathsea version 6.4.1 - Custom.arXivID=https://arxiv.or
saved by
related reading
- [2502.14143] Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AIarxiv.org
- [2312.06942] AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversionarxiv.org
- [2507.11473] Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safetyarxiv.org
- 2312.06942arxiv.org
- [2608.03958] A game theory for foundation models shows new paths to rational cooperation through similarity inferencearxiv.org
- Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationarxiv.org
- [2602.09514] EcoGym: Evaluating LLMs for Long-Horizon Plan-and-Execute in Interactive Economiesarxiv.org
- Predicting LLM Safety Before Release by Simulating Deploymentcdn.openai.com
- [2206.12765] Generalized Beliefs for Cooperative AIarxiv.org
- [2607.07368] Multi-Agent AI Control: Distributed Attacks Hamper Per-Instance Monitorsarxiv.org
- [2309.15817] Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandboxarxiv.org
- f316275b44ee2de533102913828a8107-Paper-Datasets_and_Benchmarks_Track.pdfproceedings.neurips.cc