Inconsistent Languages - EKLUND - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research - Wiley Online Library
Use the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more. Share a link The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in both conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox. Volume64, Issue2 March 2002 Pages 251-275 Is truth inconsistent? COHERENTISM AND JUSTIFIED INCONSISTENT BELIEFS: A SOLUTION Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Précis of Ontology Made Easy Comments on Ontology Made Easy by Amie Thomasson When publishers deposit their content metadata to CrossRef, article citations are tracked and linked, allowing you to see how many times each article