Max More, The Diachronic Self - PhilPapers
Sign in | Create an account PhilPapers PhilPeople PhilArchive PhilEvents PhilJobs New Topics Journals Submit material More The Diachronic Self Max More Dissertation, University of Southern California (1995) Copy BIBTEX Abstract The Diachronic Self fills out and clarifies the account of personal identity presented by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. I go on to draw metaphysical and normative consequences of this psychological reductionist theory. Some of the normative inferences disagree with those of Parfit. I examine several candidates for a necessary causal condition for personal identity or continuity and argue that we should accept one of the most liberal conditions, allowing personal identity to persist even if its cause is abnormal and unreliable. After establishing a causal condition for identity I apply psychological reductionism to critically analyze current conditions of and criteria for the death of persons. I argue that cardiac and consciousness based conceptions a
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