flâneur

The average utilitarian’s solipsism wager – The Universe from an Intentional Stance

casparoesterheld.com · 576 words · saved by 1 readers

The following prudential argument is relatively common in my circles: We probably live in a simulation, but if we don’t, our actions matter much more. Thus, expected value calculations are do…

The following prudential argument is relatively common in my circles: We probably live in a simulation , but if we don’t, our actions matter much more. Thus, expected value calculations are dominated by the utility under the assumption that we (or some copies of ours) are in the real world. Consequently, the simulation argument affects our prioritization only slightly — we should still mostly act under the assumption that we are not in a simulation. A commonly cited analogy is due to Michael Vassar : “If you think you are Napoleon, and [almost] everyone that thinks this way i

related reading