Weak central government, strong legal rights: the origins of divergent legal institutions in 18th-century Chinese and Japanese rice markets | Humanities and Social Sciences Communications

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Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript. Advertisement Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume 11, Article number: 30 (2024) Cite this article 2742 Accesses 6 Altmetric Metrics details This paper examines the formation of legal institutions in Qing China and Tokugawa Japan with a focus on the rice market. In both countries in the 18th century, rice was the most important commodity. By the end of 18th century, Japan offered strong legal rights to rice market participants, while China managed the rice market with weak legal institutions. We develop a subversive regime game model to explain some of the social and political reasons behind this divergen

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Weak central government, strong legal rights: the origins of divergent legal institutions in 18th-century Chinese and Japanese rice markets | Humanities and Social Sciences Communications

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