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The adversarial culture in philosophy does not serve the truth | Aeon Ideas

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is department chair and professor of history of philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He is currently finalising his latest book Socialising Minds: Intersubjectivity in Early Modern Philosophy (2020). Edited bySam Dresser Nero and Seneca (1904), by Eduardo Barrón Gonzáles. Photo courtesy Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid Philosophical discussions, whether in a professional setting or at the bar, frequently consist of calling out mistakes in whatever has been proposed: ‘This is all very well, but …’ This adversarial style is often celebrated as truth-conducive. Eliminating false assumptions seems to leave us with truth in the marketplace of ideas. Although this is a fairly pervasive practice (even I am practising it right now), I doubt that it is a particularly good approach to philosophical discussions. The lack of progress in adversarial philosophical exchange might rest on a simple but problematic division of labour: in professional settings such as talks, semi

Nero and Seneca (1904), by Eduardo Barrón Gonzáles. Photo courtesy Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid Philosophical discussions, whether in a professional setting or at the bar, frequently consist of calling out mistakes in whatever has been proposed: ‘This is all very well, but …’ This adversarial style is often celebrated as truth-conducive. Eliminating false assumptions seems to leave us with truth in the marketplace of ideas. Although this is a fairly pervasive practice (even I am practising it right now), I doubt that it is a particularly good approach to philosophical discussions. The…

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