Self-generated prompt injections in compaction summaries · OpenAI Alignment
alignment.openai.com · 1,343 words · saved by 1 readers
Research on aligning AI with human values and intent, and reports documenting model failures.
Internal unreleased Astra family model · RL training Incident date: Jul 18, 2026 Discovered: Aug 9, 2026 Report updated: Sep 16, 2026 Summary We observed rare cases of a model writing jailbreak-like instructions into its own compaction summaries (the summaries used to continue a task in a new context). Our conclusion was that this behavior was extremely rare, did not confer an obvious reward advantage, and was monitorable. Our top hypothesis is that issues around summary termination contributed to this behavior, though we have not established a causal connection, and we have addressed a…
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