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267 Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Volume 29, Number 2, Spring 1988 Precisificαtion by Means of Vague Predicates ROY A. SORENSEN* My main theses are that (a) it is impossible for all of language to be vague, and (b) some precise predicates can be defined in terms of vague predicates. These propositions are the negations of two used by Bertrand Russell to criti- cize the suggestion that the problems posed by vague predicates can be solved by precisifying definitions. After reviewing this criticism, I argue for (a) in the second section and (b)…

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