Block vs. Slot Auction PBS — Julian Ma
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) calls for choice on auction mechanism design. In this post we consider what the effect is of different auction mechanisms on MEV
Thanks to Barnabé Monnot and Alex Stokes for helpful feedback and discussion. Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a design philosophy where parts of block construction are outsourced to out-of-protocol agents. PBS currently exists in the form of MEV-Boost . In all of these designs, however, we need to decide whether to implement block auctions or slot auctions. In Barnabé’s post on the state of PBS , he briefly introduced the topic of block vs. slot auctions. The goal of this post is to expand upon this by defining the two situations more precisely, investigating how different forms of maximu
related reading
- Notes on Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)barnabe.substack.com
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- Decentralizing the Builder Rolejoncharbonneau.substack.com
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- Priority Is All You Need - Paradigmparadigm.xyz
- Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctionsarxiv.org
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