Addendum: Endgame Perils of Restaking - by Tripoli
dataalways.substack.com · 994 words · saved by 1 readers
Clarifying some details from Endgame Perils of Restaking.
A supplement to Endgame Perils of Restaking. Restaking protocols are explicitly framed as opt-in, but when we examine how out-of-protocol yield distorts the incentive structures of the Ethereum Network, we see that over time, restaking can become a macroscopically coercive force on all validators. The subsidization of an open-set of validators allows adopters to operate in a lower base APR environment and out-compete non-adopting validators. This dynamic is not unique to restaking; it is also observed with liquid staking tokens and MEV-boost. However, the three have different risk factors…
saved by
related reading
- Time, slots, and the ordering of events in Ethereum Proof-of-Stake - Paradigmparadigm.xyz
- Approaches to MEV: Ethereum vs Cosmos | Reveriereverie.ooo
- Optimistic relays and where to find themfrontier.tech
- The Hitchhiker's Guide to Ethereum - Delphi Digitalmembers.delphidigital.io
- Semantics of Staking 1: Liquefaction — The price of agencymirror.xyz
- Should Ethereum be okay with enshrining more things in the protocol?vitalik.eth.limo
- How much should you pay for restaking security?arxiv.org
- EigenLayer: Decentralized Ethereum Restaking Protocol Explained | Consensysconsensys.net
- On Collusionvitalik.eth.limo
- Relays in a post-ePBS world - Proof-of-Stake - Ethereum Researchethresear.ch
- Exploring MEV on EigenLayergalaxy.com
- Possible futures of the Ethereum protocol, part 2: The Surgevitalik.eth.limo