EDT with updating double counts – The sideways view
I recently got confused thinking about the following case: Calculator bet: I am offered the opportunity to bet on a mathematical statement X to which I initially assign 50% probability (perhaps X =…
I recently got confused thinking about the following case: Calculator bet: I am offered the opportunity to bet on a mathematical statement X to which I initially assign 50% probability (perhaps X = 139926 is a quadratic residue modulo 314159). I have access to a calculator that is 99% reliable, i.e. it corrupts the answer 1% of the time at random. The calculator says that X is true. With what probability should I be willing to wager? I think the answer is clearly “99%.” But a naive application of EDT can recommend betting with 99.99% probability. I think this is a mistake, and unde
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related reading
- EDT with updating double counts — LessWronglesswrong.com
- Thoughts on Updatelessness – The Universe from an Intentional Stancecasparoesterheld.com
- Operationalizing FDT — LessWronglesswrong.com
- In defense of anthropically updating EDT — LessWronglesswrong.com
- UDT shows that decision theory is more puzzling than ever — LessWronglesswrong.com
- Open-minded updatelessness — LessWronglesswrong.com
- Updatelessness doesn't solve most problems — LessWronglesswrong.com
- Towards a scale-free theory of intelligent agencymindthefuture.info
- Bayesian Mindsetcold-takes.com
- On Functional Decision Theory :: Wolfgang Schwarzumsu.de
- Probabilities are not the right concept — LessWronglesswrong.com
- Embedded Agency (full-text version) — LessWronglesswrong.com