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Chapter 6: Against Modest Epistemology | Inadequate Equilibria

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An argument against modesty’s central idea: that we should be very hesitant to take our own reasoning at face value in the face of novelty or disagreement.

Chapter 6: Against Modest Epistemology | Inadequate Equilibria Inadequate Equilibria --> Chapter 6 Against Modest Epistemology Modest epistemology doesn’t need to reflect a skepticism about causal models as such. It can manifest instead as a wariness about putting weight down on one’s own causal models, as opposed to others’. In 1976, Robert Aumann demonstrated that two ideal Bayesian reasoners with the same priors cannot have common knowledge of a disagreement. Tyler Cowen and Robin Hanson have extended this result, establishing that even under various weaker assumptions, something has

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