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Mediated Equilibria in Load-Balancing Games | SpringerLink

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Slider with three content items shown per slide. Use the Previous and Next buttons to navigate the slides or the slide controller buttons at the end to navigate through each slide. Olivier Brun & Balakrishna Prabhu Shibashis Guha, Orna Kupferman & Gal Vardi 2356 Accesses Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5929)) Mediators are third parties to whom the players in a game can delegate the task of choosing a strategy; a mediator forms a mediated equilibrium if delegating is a best response for all players. Mediated equilibria have more power to achieve outcomes with high social welfare than Nash or correlated equilibria, but less power than a fully centralized authority. Here we begin the study of the power of mediation by using the mediation analogue of the price of stability—the ratio of the social cost of the best mediated equilibrium B M E to that of the socially optimal outcome O P T . We focus on load-balancing games with social cost measured

Abstract Mediators are third parties to whom the players in a game can delegate the task of choosing a strategy; a mediator forms a mediated equilibrium if delegating is a best response for all players. Mediated equilibria have more power to achieve outcomes with high social welfare than Nash or correlated equilibria, but less power than a fully centralized authority. Here we begin the study of the power of mediation by using the mediation analogue of the price of stability—the ratio of the social cost of the best mediated equilibrium \(\textsc{bme}\) to that of the socially optimal outcome \(

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