Brian Hedden, Counterfactual Decision Theory - PhilArchive
Sign in | Create an account PhilPapers PhilPeople PhilArchive PhilEvents PhilJobs Submit Browse More Download Counterfactual Decision Theory Brian Hedden Mind 132 (527):730-761 (2023) Copy BIBTEX Abstract I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination, an action can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an action can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. And in cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactuall