Let's discuss sandbox isolation
A dive into the spectrum of sandboxing and isolation, from Linux namespaces and gVisor to hardware-enforced microVMs and WebAssembly, and why picking the right boundary matters for multi-tenant workloads.
There is a lot of energy right now around sandboxing untrusted code. AI agents generating and executing code, multi-tenant platforms running customer scripts, RL training pipelines evaluating model outputs—basically, you have code you did not write, and you need to run it without letting it compromise the host, other tenants, or itself in unexpected ways. The word "isolation" gets used loosely. A Docker container is "isolated." A microVM is "isolated." A WebAssembly module is "isolated." But these are fundamentally different things, with different boundaries, different attack surfaces, and dif
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related reading
- The Container Security Platform - gVisorgvisor.dev
- Sandboxing JavaScript Code — Andrew Healeyhealeycodes.com
- Optimizing seccomp usage in gVisor - gVisorgvisor.dev
- Hidden Technical Debt of AI Systems: Agent Runtimeleehanchung.github.io
- firecracker/docs/design.md at main · firecracker-microvm/firecrackergithub.com
- Assessing Claude Mythos Preview’s cybersecurity capabilities \ Anthropicred.anthropic.com
- NYSRGnotes.ekzhang.com
- nsdi20-paper-agache.pdfusenix.org
- What is an AI code sandbox?modal.com
- Cloud Computing without Containers | The Cloudflare Blogblog.cloudflare.com
- Vercel Sandboxvercel.com
- rsmsrsms.me