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[1401.5577] Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic

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[1401.5577] Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic Skip to main content arXiv is now an independent nonprofit! Learn more × Search arXiv Press Enter to search · Advanced search --> Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory arXiv:1401.5577 (cs) [Submitted on 22 Jan 2014 ( v1 ), last revised 5 Apr 2021 (this version, v2)] Title: Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic Authors: Mihaly Barasz , Paul Christiano , Benja Fallenstein , Marcello Herreshoff , Patrick LaVictoire , Eliez

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