Commitment Games with Conditional Information Disclosure | Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Commitment Games with Conditional Information Disclosure Authors Anthony DiGiovanni Center on Long-Term Risk Jesse Clifton Center on Long-Term Risk DOI: https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25697 Keywords: GTEP: Game Theory, GTEP: Equilibrium Abstract The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner’s Dilemmas and other failures of cooperation in complete information settings. But inefficiencies due to private informat
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